Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) is pleased to announce a tender for the boring and installation of 65 hand pumps in the districts of Charsadda (45 pumps) and Nowshera (20 pumps). This project is part of our initiative “Building Disaster Resilient Communities in Flood Affected Areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” funded by Help, a German humanitarian organization.
Tender Details:
o Tender Reference No: PPAK-40-23-24-A7-3
o Release Date: August 22, 2024, at 4:00 PM
o Closure Date: September 12, 2024, at 5:00 PM
We invite qualified and specialized contractors, operating individually or in consortiums, registered in Pakistan to participate. Tender documents will be provided via email upon receipt of your Acknowledgement Letter, to be sent to mzeb72@gmail.com. All submissions must be hand-delivered in separate sealed and stamped envelopes for technical and financial offers to CAMP’s office in Peshawar by the closing date. Late bids will be rejected.
For any inquiries, please contact mzeb72@gmail.com or asadaqu@gmail.com
We look forward to your participation in enhancing the resilience of our communities through this crucial infrastructure development.
In South Waziristan, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that borders Afghanistan, suspected militants recently targeted a girls’ school in the village of Karikot, near Wana City. This marks the second such attack this month. The overnight explosion damaged a newly constructed schoolroom, but fortunately, no casualties were reported.
The Afghan Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 exerted a significant psychological and ideological influence across the Durand Line, particularly in the merged districts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. This pivotal event emboldened the Pakistani Taliban, who are now re-emerging as a security concerns within Pakistan by increasingly targeting security forces, local communities, and further restricting girls’ education, thus reflecting a resurgence of militant activities in the region.
The female literacy rate in the former FATA region is distressingly low at 7.8%. According to the former FATA Annual Education Census 2017, only 37% of girls attend primary school and a mere 5% continue to secondary school. This compares to 49% of boys at the primary level and 17% at the secondary level. Additionally, it was reported that 14.7% of girls aged 3 to 13 had never been enrolled in any school.
Despite pre-existing challenges to girls’ education from local Taliban influences, the Taliban’s ascendancy in Afghanistan reinvigorated conservative factions. This led to heightened enforcement of stringent gender norms and an amplified discourse on the visibility and role of women in public spheres. This resurgence has negatively impacted societal attitudes, further complicating efforts for gender inclusivity and educational reforms in the region. Pashtun culture, particularly in the tribal areas, is already very conservative, and the Taliban’s policies have exacerbated the situation, severely limiting educational opportunities for girls and reinforcing conservative views on gender roles.
The ban on girls’ education over 12 years old in Afghanistan is a reflection of a reassertion of conservative values, influenced both by a strict interpretation of Islamic law and deep-rooted Pashtun tribal norms concerning gender roles. These norms prioritize the control of women’s visibility and actions in public spheres, often justified under the premise of protecting familial and societal honor. In December 2022, restrictions on women in Afghanistan intensified. Women were barred from attending university, and new regulations were introduced that limited their travel without a male relative, dictated their attire, restricted their employment opportunities, and even prohibited visits to local parks.
For over a decade, girls’ schools have been prime targets for militant groups affiliated with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with a shared agenda. These attacks have not only exacerbated the already poor infrastructure, but also instilled fear among the scarce teaching staff, severely hindering their ability to conduct classes and thereby limiting educational opportunities for local girls. Data on the extent of destruction is fragmented and not consolidated, but it is well-documented that the majority of these attacks have occurred in North and South Waziristan districts, known strongholds of Taliban activities where the targeting of educational institutions, especially those for girls, has been most intense.
Despite the proximity of girls’ schools to village dwellings and their protection by local Maliks (tribal chiefs), militants have persistently been able to target these buildings. This ongoing vulnerability raises questions about the effectiveness of local security measures. Additionally, about half of these schools have fallen into disuse—some abandoned, others repurposed by Maliks for personal uses such as guest houses or residences for second wives. This information comes from a report compiled over a decade ago by a national NGO to which I contributed. The failure to protect and maintain these schools underscores the complex challenges of sustaining educational infrastructure in conflict-affected areas.
The Taliban’s prohibitions are influenced by a broader sociocultural context in Taliban-dominated Pashtun tribal society in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where girls’ education is often viewed with suspicion and considered a source of moral and social discord.
Let’s examine why the Taliban prohibit girls’ education after the age of 12, coinciding with the onset of puberty. This policy raises questions about whether the motivations are primarily religious or if they stem from cultural constraints. Understanding the interplay between the Taliban’s interpretation of Islamic tenets and the Pashtun cultural norms that emphasize control over women’s visibility and roles in public spheres could provide insights into this restrictive practice.
The Taliban’s prohibitions are influenced by a broader sociocultural context in Taliban-dominated Pashtun tribal society in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where girls’ education is often viewed with suspicion and considered a source of moral and social discord. While Islam does not inherently restrict the education of women, deeply entrenched cultural practices within the tribal communities misinterpret religious teachings to justify the restriction of women’s rights, including their right to education.
My doctoral field research involved engaging with progressive and educated Pashtun women from the merged districts who are educators, civil society activists, and advocates of girls’ education in their communities. Their experiences and narratives reveal that restrictions on women are more about entrenched cultural norms than religious dictates. These discussions suggest that the underlying causes of such restrictions are rooted in the political economy of culture, shaping societal behaviors and attitudes towards women in these regions.
Women’s daily lives under these restrictions are marked by extreme social control. For example, local women describe oppressive conditions where the use of basic personal care items like soap can raise suspicions, and wearing new and “flashy” clothing is prohibited, both seen as attempts to attract male attention. The most severe consequence of these cultural restrictions is the risk of honour killings for women caught speaking with males outside their immediate family.
Contrasting with the current scenario is the legacy of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the settled districts of the same regions dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group. His advocacy for education, rooted in nonviolence and enlightenment principles, led the progressive movement known as the Khudai Khidmatgar or “Servants of God,” founded during the British colonial period. This movement served not only as a political stance against colonial rule, but also as a crusade against ignorance, underscoring the pivotal role of education in societal reform. Although this movement never firmly established itself in the tribal areas, it provides a valuable case study for raising awareness and sensitizing local communities in Afghanistan and the merged districts of Pakistan.
The ban on girls’ education over 12 years old in Afghanistan is a reflection of a reassertion of conservative values, influenced both by a strict interpretation of Islamic law and deep-rooted Pashtun tribal norms concerning gender roles. These norms prioritize the control of women’s visibility and actions in public spheres, often justified under the premise of protecting familial and societal honour.
Considering the situation, the outlook appears quite pessimistic, with no clear avenues to persuade the Afghan Taliban to reopen schools in Afghanistan or halt the bombardment of schools in the merged districts of Pakistan. The initial step for the government of Pakistan and civil society is to engage with local communities and the Afghan Taliban, despite their status as the de facto regime. Convincing the Afghan Taliban to reopen girls’ schools in Afghanistan could pave the way for ceasing the bombardment of girls’ schools in the merged districts.
Engaging with the Taliban to facilitate pathways for girls’ education in areas under their control requires a nuanced combination of diplomatic, strategic, and community-based approaches. Here are some recommendations that could be effective in promoting educational opportunities for girls:
It is critical to actively involve the Pashtun communities from both Afghanistan and Pakistan in discussions about girls’ education. This collaborative approach should include the Afghan Taliban to ensure comprehensive community support and acceptance. Integrating these communities into the discourse not only promotes a broader consensus but also leverages their intrinsic cultural and familial ties to enhance the impact of educational reforms. This inclusive strategy can help to address the unique challenges and perceptions faced in each area, fostering a cross-border alliance that supports the educational rights of girls.
Both the government and civil society in Afghanistan and the merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should collaborate with local and international Islamic scholars to promote the religious acceptability and advantages of girls’ education from an Islamic perspective. By presenting education as not only permissible but also encouraged under Islamic law, these initiatives can help transform local perceptions. Organizing a series of seminars and discussions where scholars can interact directly with Afghan Taliban leaders and community members will be crucial. Successfully persuading the Afghan Taliban could have a significant ripple effect on their counterparts in the merged districts, potentially fostering broader acceptance and implementation of girls’ education.
The government of Pakistan should leverage international diplomatic tools and channels to apply pressure on the Taliban, potentially linking foreign aid and relief to significant improvements in human rights, especially concerning girls’ education. Given its close proximity and deep cross-border community ties, Pakistan is uniquely positioned to prompt influential Muslim-majority countries to mediate. These countries can exert their cultural and religious influence to effectively champion girls’ education.
The outlook appears quite pessimistic, with no clear avenues to persuade the Afghan Taliban to reopen schools in Afghanistan or halt the bombardment of schools in the merged districts of Pakistan.
Local Community Involvement
As noted, the Pakistani Pashtun community has strong connections with Afghan society. The government and civil society should facilitate discussions between Pakistani tribal communities and Afghan Taliban officials to underscore the importance of education for all, including girls. Additionally, garnering community support can significantly influence the Taliban’s policies. It is essential to empower local leaders, including women in safer areas, to actively advocate for girls’ education.
Leveraging Historical Movements for Educational Reform
To foster educational reforms and enhance societal acceptance of girls’ education in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is recommended to draw inspiration from the legacy of Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Utilizing this historical example as a case study, governmental and non-governmental organizations should develop awareness campaigns and sensitization programs that emphasize the movement’s principles of nonviolence and enlightenment. These efforts could inspire communities by demonstrating the successful integration of education reforms in similarly conservative settings, thus paving the way for broader acceptance and implementation in the current context.
These recommendations are fundamental starting points, with a more detailed strategy to be developed subsequently. Employing these strategies could potentially lead to positive changes, setting the stage for more inclusive educational policies for girls. It is crucial to approach this engagement with a nuanced understanding of the local context and a commitment to ongoing dialogue and collaboration.
Last month, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP) hosted a landmark conference in Peshawar, bringing together global development partners to mobilize public investments for the advancement of the Merged Districts. Major stakeholders, including USAID, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, and various United Nations agencies, reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing the socio-economic development of the region.
In mid-2018, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were redesignated as the Merged Districts (MDs) through the 25th Constitutional Amendment, integrating the region into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Six years after the merger, the Federal and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial governments have struggled to make substantial progress in effectively integrating the former FATA region into Pakistan. Their limited success reflects challenges in implementing the necessary administrative, legal, and developmental reforms to ensure true integration. Despite the federal government’s commitment to allocate 3% of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, equating to Rs 100 billion annually over a decade, it has yet to fulfill this pledge.
Judicial complexes have been established, but in some districts, they are absent and instead located in adjacent districts, complicating access to justice for the local populace. Police reforms have been slow, with the Khasadar and Levies transitioning into a police force yet lacking essential skills, often providing their own weapons and purchasing uniforms at personal expense. The most encouraging progress is the establishment of a women’s desk in Bara, a positive and welcoming sign.
The role of the Political Agent was replaced by the District Commissioner of the neighboring district. However, this bureaucratic position continues to retain its colonial approach toward locals, treating them more as subjects than as citizens deserving public service. Furthermore, the slow pace of land reforms has led to disputes across many areas, stalling progress and undermining the government’s pledges to ensure the merger’s legitimacy through comprehensive reforms. As a result, many key areas of reform remain unaddressed.
The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has emboldened the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has resurfaced as a significant threat to the state’s authority. This militant group, now a powerful stakeholder, is advocating for the reversal of the merger of erstwhile FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Prior to 2018, popular support for the FATA merger was significantly high among the masses. A series of research studies conducted by CAMP (Community Appraisal & Motivation Program) between 2007 and 2012 in all seven districts of the MDs and six frontier regions revealed that most people supported merging of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, believing it was their fundamental right to be treated as equal citizens. The findings also revealed a general reluctance to embrace specific institutions, such as establishing police stations and adopting the modern judicial system in place of the centuries-old jirga (council of elders). Therefore, despite their desire for equality, these communities were hesitant about changes that would accompany the merger due to deep-seated concerns over its impact on their traditional way of life.
The widespread support for the merger stemmed from the competition between tribal elders and the common population, which, more specifically, manifested as a generational conflict over political leadership. Despite cultural constraints that traditionally favored elders, significant events like the Soviet-Afghan Jihad and the post-9/11 global dynamics disrupted the established age-based hierarchy within tribal society. This disruption opened up new spaces for youth to assert their agency and challenge the long-standing dominance of the elders, enabling a shift toward broader acceptance of the merger. As I argue in my PhD thesis, the older generation had already solidified its control over the political landscape, while the younger generation sought to carve out space for itself. This generational divide highlighted differing aspirations and approaches toward political engagement and leadership.
The opposition to the merger by actors such as tribal aristocrats, politicians, and bureaucrats has intensified, leading to greater confusion for both the government and the donor community. This vocal opposition is fueled by longstanding alliances among these groups, who were primary beneficiaries of the pre-merger status quo.
However, the current conundrum surrounding the merger debate has bred mistrust in state institutions, leading to disillusionment among youth. While these changes initially opened new avenues for younger generations to engage in the political process, the inability to resolve tensions within the merger framework has undermined confidence, deepening the rift between state institutions and the aspirations of the younger population. Those, particularly living in poverty, are questioning whether their support for the merger was wise or if they were misled under the pretext of enhanced security. Many of those I interacted with expressed that they are grappling with the reality of unmet promises and unfulfilled reforms, questioning whether the merger has genuinely served their best interests.
Currently, various actors are at play and exploiting this sentiment, capitalizing on the slow merger process and the communities’ limited representation in mainstream political decision-making, which has amplified their sense of marginalization and uncertainty. The opposition to the merger by actors such as tribal aristocrats, politicians, and bureaucrats has intensified, leading to greater confusion for both the government and the donor community. This vocal opposition is fueled by longstanding alliances among these groups, who were primary beneficiaries of the pre-merger status quo.
Claiming to represent local interests, these actors try to manipulate government and donor priorities to advance their own agendas, directing investments in ways that do not benefit the general population. Simultaneously, the government’s failure to fulfilled its promises has provided these voices with an opportunity to spin facts, confuse locals, and influence policies that could potentially revert the region to its previous status. While such a regression is unlikely, the ensuing confusion could delay progress and misdirect investments into unproductive sectors.
On the other hand, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has emboldened the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has resurfaced as a significant threat to the state’s authority. This militant group, now a powerful stakeholder, is advocating for the reversal of the merger of erstwhile FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Their aim is to reintroduce Sharia law, challenging the state’s writ and destabilizing the region by promoting a return to pre-merger conditions.
The slow progress and unfulfilled promises concerning the integration of the former FATA region into Pakistan could lead to widespread disillusionment, particularly among the youth, who have worked hard to secure their place in decision-making. This, in turn, may result in chaos and foster deep mistrust toward the state.
To expedite the mainstreaming process and ensure effective integration, the government should prioritize several key recommendations. Firstly, it is crucial to expedite the implementation of the administrative, legal, and developmental reforms outlined in the merger agreement, ensuring the process is inclusive of youth and other vulnerable groups to foster their sense of empowerment. This includes expediting the establishment of judicial complexes and police stations, ensuring their accessibility to all communities within the MDs. Additionally, the government must streamline land reforms to resolve disputes promptly and fairly, providing a foundation for economic stability and growth.
The slow progress and unfulfilled promises concerning the integration of the former FATA region into Pakistan could lead to widespread disillusionment, particularly among the youth, who have worked hard to secure their place in decision-making.
Secondly, tackling the socio-economic challenges in the MDs necessitates targeted interventions that create employment opportunities, generate sustainable livelihoods, and secure social protection for vulnerable groups through community involvement which should aim to strengthen community resilience. The government and donor community should directly engage the broader population rather than tribal elders and urban elite, who have exploited previous schemes through corruption and favoritism.
To prioritize inclusive governance, mechanisms should be established for community engagement and consultation in decision-making processes, ensuring that marginalized voices are represented and respected. This could be achieved through investment in infrastructure development, vocational training programs, and support for small-scale enterprises, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, livestock, e-commerce, and renewable energy.
Thirdly, strengthening the legal and administrative systems is crucial for improving governance and enhancing public trust. This includes enhancing the capacity and accountability of local government bodies, empowering them to effectively address the needs of their communities. Furthermore, initiatives to enhance transparency, accountability, and access to justice should be prioritized, ensuring that all citizens can exercise their rights and seek redress for grievances.
Overall, the successful mainstreaming of the former FATA region requires a sincere and holistic approach that addresses the complex challenges facing the MDs. By implementing these recommendations, the government can not only expedite the mainstreaming process but also foster inclusive development, strengthen governance, and promote peace and stability in the region.
Kurram, formerly part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and now the Merged Areas, is embroiled in enduring sectarian rifts. Situated in northwestern Pakistan, it grapples with multifaceted challenges that span social, economic, and political domains. With a population of 619,553, the district is an intricate blend of 58% Sunnis and 42% Shias. Prominent tribes like the Turi, Bangash, Tari Mangal, and others inadvertently influence sectarian tensions. An important factor exacerbating these differences is the indigenous Pashtunwali code, which magnifies these discrepancies by combining tribal intricacies with religious dissonance.
Kurram’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan makes it susceptible to the ramifications of Afghan conflict. Sectarian turbulence, particularly in Parachinar in upper Kurram, exacerbated after the September 2001 incidents, with a significant escalation leading to the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Kurram’s proximity to Afghan conflict areas also facilitated a consistent exchange of militants. This bolstered extremist ideologies, further deepening the Kurram conflict. Moreover, many Kurrams attribute disturbances to external interference, especially from the Afghan Taliban and Iranian influence.
Over the past two decades, this region has witnessed astounding loss of life, widespread injuries, and mass displacement. In particular, there was a conflict between 2007 and 2010, claiming over 3,000 lives, according to various media reports. Although the severity of the conflict diminished for a certain period, 2017 witnessed a renewed escalation in violence.
Both sides use a variety of methods that involve sophisticated assault weapons, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations. Regrettably, in the wake of forced displacement, their land, homes, and commercial properties were seized and occupied by adversarial groups, and they were not willing to reach a solution that may contribute significantly to local peace according to local sources. The government’s approach, as highlighted by various voices within the region, has not been holistic, indicating the need for a more comprehensive strategy.
In the past quarter of 2023, Kurram was once again marred by an uptick of sectarian violence. A series of incidents, seemingly trivial or based on personal disputes, have been manipulated into full-blown sectarian confrontations, often incited by misinformation or bias.
On July 4, 2023, an incident transpired wherein a van driver, from the Sunni community and tasked with conveying school personnel from Parachinar city to Tiri Mangal for examination responsibilities, was shot dead by anonymous assailants near the vicinity of Norki village of Tiri Mangal. Notably, Tiri Mangal is largely a Sunni-inhabited region. Although the tragic event originated from a personal family dispute involving the driver, it was misconstrued as having sectarian implications. Erroneous narratives disseminated by prejudiced parties insinuated that Shia individuals had perpetrated violence against the Sunnis, leading to a swift escalation in tensions. Mere hours after the driver’s death, an unidentified group launched an attack on a governmental educational institution in Tiri Mangal, targeting Shia personnel from Parachinar present for examination duties. The assault resulted in the loss of seven lives, including four teachers and three ancillary staff members.
In another incident that occurred on July 7, 2023, representatives from the Shia community ventured into Boshehra, a region with a Sunni majority, with the intention of erecting a structure on the contested shamilati arazi (commonly held land). As conveyed by my local residents, both the Shia and Sunni factions asserted proprietary rights to this land. Concurrently, the Sunni community intervened to impede the construction, and a subsequent verbal alteration culminated in a violent confrontation initiated by Shia representatives, leading to an immediate fatality. This incident ignited a series of tumultuous and sectarian confrontations that rapidly proliferated to encompass various townships within the district, from Upper to Lower Kurram.
According to the archives of the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of the KP, eight protracted land disagreements prevail within the central, upper, and lower segments of Kurram district. Some of these disputes have roots that are traced back to pre-independence times. Locals, interviewed for this piece, validated the explanation that disagreements pertaining to land, water resources, and other matters intensified due to their sectarian perspective. I consulted influential locals from both sides in July 2023 who claimed that these episodes catalyzed the recent escalation of hostility in Upper Kurram.
Social media has exacerbated the prevailing discord. Narratives laden with derogatory and incendiary content, predominantly disseminated by younger members from both factions, intensified animosities between divergent sects, and further augmented sectarian tensions.
Sectarian clashes often lead to the blockade of passages between Shia-dominated and Sunni-dominated regions. Tiri Mangal, a Sunni-populated area, is one such area that is severely affected, as the shutdown of schools and healthcare facilities is common. With the prevailing low literacy rate in this region, these shutdowns hamper educational and healthcare services. This is exacerbated by the fact that staff from the more literate Parachinar area cannot travel. Essential services, such as launching a polio campaign, are also hindered. Additionally, blockades disrupt the delivery of crucial goods, including food and medicines, profoundly affecting daily routine. This is especially difficult for daily wage workers and small business owners because of limitations on movement and earnings.
The population of Shia faces similar challenges. The sealing of the route from the Sunni-centric Bosherah to Parachinar disrupts the inflow of supplies from Lower Kurram and beyond. The city of Parachinar, a vital economic center in the Kurram district, is frequently affected by curtailing the operations of laborers and local traders. The Kharlachi border trade with Afghanistan is also not spared. The community grapples with food and medicine shortages as well as restricted healthcare access.
Both the Sunni and Shia groups endured a relentless backdrop of tension and apprehension. The sealing of roads, educational institutions, and health centers, combined with interruptions in utilities such as communication and electricity, deeply strains everyday living. The overarching atmosphere of uncertainty, heightened by concerns over the potential loss of life and property, is palpable. Essential healthcare, especially for vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, children, and the elderly, is frequently out of reach owing to facility shutdowns. This neglect of basic human rights further jeopardizes their well-being, underscoring the profound consequences of these sectarian clashes on both communities.
Written land records exist in both the Kurram and North Waziristan districts of the FATA. However, most tribal areas depend on oral traditions, with jirgas (councils of the elders) resolving land disputes. In Kurram, land ownership was documented twice by the British, once in 1905 and again in 1943.
Efforts by the government post-2009 did not bring about a durable solution, mainly due to a governance system that marginalized local political voices and leaning heavily on military support. This administrative oversight failed to address the ongoing tensions between the Turi and Bangash Tribes. To address this conflict, the KP government recently established a high-ranking commission to oversee land issues in Kurram, but its impact remains unclear.
Many believe that ensuring peace and enforcing law and order are the prerogative of the government. However, during the recent sectarian unrest in Kurram, the government’s response was lackluster.
It is crucial to note the absence of civil society groups or NGOs in the peacemaking process. Their lack of participation was driven by concerns about potential violence from extremists and the tedious government’s process of registration, not allowing them to access certain areas.
Subsequently, a grand jirga of 30 influential figures from various districts was created. As of July 2023, short-term truce seems to have been reached between the Shia and Sunni communities in Kurram. A year-long ceasefire was agreed upon by the grand jirga, with both factions committing mutual safety. They concurred that roads would be accessible to all and that both tribes would ensure road security. The trenches previously dug by both sides were surrendered to the security forces. A huge fine of 120 million rupees was set as the penalty for breaching the ceasefire. Daily life has resumed, and in Shia-majority Parachinar City, Moharram activities took place without disturbances.
A semblance of normalcy seems to have returned to Kurram, however, the district remains on the precipice, with the underlying causes of sectarian tension awaiting holistic solutions. It is incumbent on both regional and national stakeholders to engage collaboratively, ensuring that Kurram’s history of conflict does not dictate its future.
On Sunday, July 30, in a political rally held by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), a deadly explosion took the lives of 44 individuals and injured more than 150 people. The tragic incident took place in Khar, a town in the Bajaur district of the former Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), now the Merged Areas. None of the militant groups claimed responsibility for the attacks. The incident shook the community to its core; a chilling testament confirming the volatility of the situation.
The aftermath of the US-led NATO forces’ withdrawal in August 2021 and the subsequent resurgence of the Taliban to power in Kabul have unfolded as predicted, confirming the concerns expressed about the far-reaching security implications for the former FATA, as well as Pakistan at large. Over the past two years, there has been a notable resurgence in these militant forces. The TTP is staging a comeback, advocating for the undoing of the merger between the erstwhile FATA and Pakhtunkhwa, with the aim of reintroducing Sharia law.
The United States’ decision to suspend funding Pakistan’s military operations against Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) from its Coalition Support Fund (CSF), followed by the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, has created a power vacuum, leading to an escalation of instability and violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, ever since Pakistan made the decision to ally with the United States in the ‘War on Terror,’ it has struggled to articulate a clear and firm stance against militancy inside its territories.
Nevertheless, the consequences of this collective blind eye leave communities of the border regions of Pakistan to wrestle with the aftermath, navigating uncertain paths towards stability. This volatile environment presents a fertile ground for new recruitment, particularly among disillusioned and marginalised youth who are exposed to limited employment opportunities, faced with economic hardships, and finding themselves entrenched in a feeling of alienation and disenfranchisement. This volatile situation continues to make the youth increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by various factions of the Taliban groups, as well as the Islamic State of Khurasan (IS-K) or Daesh.
The militant narrative has successfully influenced the agency of disillusioned youth, unravelling the complexities of new alliance-making, who have relinquished their traditional ties with their tribes in pursuit of justice, purity, and the preservation of Islamic traditions.
The militants capitalize on the vulnerabilities of the youth, offering them a distorted sense of purpose, belonging, and empowerment to exercise their agency. They present themselves as alternate forces, offering solutions and reaffirming a sense of identity that has been suppressed by tribal hierarchy, constrained by oppressive colonial governance system, and erosion of social order by years of conflict.
The militant narrative has successfully influenced the agency of disillusioned youth, unravelling the complexities of new alliance-making, who have relinquished their traditional ties with their tribes in pursuit of justice, purity, and the preservation of Islamic traditions. The allure of adventure, camaraderie, and a jihadi ideology can be enticing for young individuals who feel marginalised and disconnected from mainstream society.
In the majority of suicide attacks, it is often the youth who are exploited and used as instruments of violence. These young individuals are manipulated through assurance of a blissful afterlife in paradise, a false promise used to justify their involvement in these tragic acts. The coercive and manipulative tactics used by such militant groups exploit the naivity and vulnerability of these young people, leading them down a path of violence under the misguided perception of achieving a divine reward.
The Zarb-e-Azb operation has had considerable success in terms of hunting TTP and regaining control over areas under the TTP control. However, such operations cannot eliminate militants and their narratives, which continue to pose the greatest threat to the country. The TTP poses a significant challenge to Pakistani military forces aiming to instate Islamic rule in areas with weak government control.
On the other hand, IS-K is emerging as a new threat in the former FATA, while its influence is expanding in other parts of the country. Over the years, some factions of local militant groups in the region, such as TTP, started aligning themselves with the ideology and goals of IS-K, leading to the establishment of its presence in the region. The presence of IS-K also exacerbated sectarian tension between the Shia and Sunni communities and places of worship, leading to deadly attacks and increased sectarian violence. This not only deepened the division within the local population, but also raised concerns about communal harmony and peaceful coexistence.
The militants capitalize on the vulnerabilities of the youth, offering them a distorted sense of purpose, belonging, and empowerment to exercise their agency. They present themselves as alternate forces, offering solutions and reaffirming a sense of identity that has been suppressed by tribal hierarchy, constrained by oppressive colonial governance system, and erosion of social order by years of conflict.
The consequences of youth recruitment by militant groups are profound and wide ranging. Not only does it perpetuate the cycle of violence and undermine stability within Pakhtunkhwa, it also poses a significant threat to Pakistan’s overall security. The radicalization of youth and their involvement in extremist activities perpetuate a climate of fear, disrupt societal harmony, and hinder the prospects of peace and development in the region.
Concerted efforts are required to address this growing concern. This requires a multifaceted approach that extends beyond military strategies alone. Socioeconomic development, education, and employment opportunities for youth empowerment are crucial in countering the appeal of militant groups. Promoting inclusive governance and justice system, addressing grievances, and fostering social cohesion are vital components of creating an environment that is resistant to extreme ideologies.
In addition, slow progress in implementing FATA reforms has led to widespread confusion, a lack of trust, and friction among various power holders. This includes tensions between tribal elders and youth, disagreements between Pakhtunkhwa and the federal government regarding the responsibilities of undertaking development schemes in the newly merged districts, tension between tribal elders and the government over establishing judicial infrastructure, introduction of internal policing systems, and disputes between local leadership in the merged districts and the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regarding the distribution of natural resources.
Post-withdrawal events have undeniably affirmed the apprehensions about the vulnerability of the youth in the Merged Areas to recruitment by militant groups. As Pakistan navigates this critical juncture, it is imperative to prioritise the well-being and future of its youth. Only through comprehensive measures and sustained efforts can the former FATA and the country at large mitigate the risks posed by radicalisation and extremism, fostering a more stable and prosperous future for the younger generation.
The youth of the Merged Areas stand at a difficult intersection; they are torn between the persuasive jihadi narrative spun by militants and the fading voices of Pakistan’s own counter-narrative. It is a battle of ideas fuelled by feelings of alienation, economic hardships, and a longing for identity. The road ahead may be fraught with uncertainty, but it is essential that we don’t turn a blind eye. The choices we make today, as a nation, are to empower, educate, and engage the youth of tribal areas. It is not just about combating militancy or restoring peace – it is about rebuilding our narrative, one that resonates with our young generation which will give them a sense of purpose and belonging. We must invest in their development, understand their needs, and foster an environment in which they can thrive, free from the traps of radicalisation.
Adriana, the fishing boat, with hundreds of smuggled passengers from diverse backgrounds, embarked on a perilous journey. Pakistanis were also among those on board, who, like others, were determined to pursue dreams of a better life. Little did they know that their voyage would turn deadly.
The drowning of as many as 750 smuggled passengers in the Mediterranean Sea near Greece last month has sparked serious discussions on the migration policies, responsibility of nations to provide safe pathways for asylum seekers, and urgent need to address root causes that force individuals to take desperate journeys.
The smuggling of migrants is an ongoing problem in Pakistan. The country serves as both a source and a transit point for irregular migration. Individuals are recruited for smuggling in Pakistan and smuggling networks facilitate their movement from Pakistan to Middle East, Europe and beyond.
Various push-and-pull factors drive human smuggling in Pakistan. Push factors include economic hardships, lack of employment opportunities, poverty, political instability, climate change, insecurity, and conflicts in certain regions. While, pull factors encompass the promise of better economic prospects, employment opportunities, and desire for family reunification in destination countries.
These push-and-pull factors influence people’s decisions to immigrate for a better life, leading to a migration trend through both legal and illegal channels. Pakistan is one of the largest labour-exporting countries in the region, with more than 10 million Pakistanis migrating to the Middle East and European countries since 1971, according to official statistics.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports, Pakistani nationals are among the most detected nationalities attempting irregular migration to the European Union (EU), and Australia. Remittances sent home by migrants play a crucial role in poverty reduction in the country.
Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan, Iran, and India make it a strategic location for irregular migration. Migrants often pass through Pakistan on their way to other countries, including those in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Smuggling networks in Pakistan utilise established routes, both overland and through sea, with borders with neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan and Iran, which are frequently used for smuggling operations.
The outward smuggling route from Pakistan is primarily across the vast, rugged, and sparsely populated Balochistan province, which shares borders with Iran and Afghanistan. The ‘Naukundi route’ in Balochistan is particularly notorious.
Criminal networks, smugglers, and facilitators form intricate networks to organise and execute smuggling operations, charging significant fees in exchange for transportation, documentation, and guidance throughout the migration journey.
Human smuggling poses significant risks and dangers to migrants. Migrants who participate in irregular migration face numerous risks. They often travel in overcrowded boats, hidden compartments of vehicles, or on foot through treacherous terrain. These networks often exploit vulnerable migrants by subjecting them to dangerous conditions, physical abuse, and extortion. This exposes them to hazards, such as human trafficking, physical violence, sexual abuse, extortion, kidnapping, and death.
The recent incident of trawler sinking in Greece should serve as a wake-up call for countries such as Pakistan – to invest in border control and mass awareness campaigns that educate potential migrants about the risks involved in irregular migration and the importance of travelling via legal pathways.
To combat irregular migration, two important laws were passed in 2018 – Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (PTPA) and Prevention of Smuggling of Migrants Act (PSMA). Still the law enforcement agencies face many challenges, such as inadequate resources, limited capacity and corruption.
Surprisingly, the performance of the government departments and ministries, directly and indirectly involved in checking smuggling of migrants, is not up to the mark. The government must bring together all relevant departments and clearly define their roles and responsibilities.
Based on my research interviews with government officials, the UN agencies and private sector entities specialising in migrant smuggling, I have gathered several recommendations:
1- Successful interventions require coordination between national and international law enforcement agencies. While irregular migration is a legal and security concern, it is crucial to approach this issue from a humanitarian perspective. Many migrants are driven by desperate circumstances and seek safety, better livelihood, or family reunification. Humanitarian responses should focus on protecting migrants’ rights, providing access to basic services, and addressing the underlying causes of irregular migration.
2- Investing in modern surveillance technology, such as cameras, radar systems, and drones, can help in monitoring and securing border areas. Increasing the presence of border patrol forces and equipping them with necessary resources and training is also crucial. Strengthening cooperation and information sharing with neighbouring countries can aid in coordinated border control efforts.
3- Providing comprehensive training programmes to border control personnel, law enforcement agencies, and relevant government officials can enhance their skills in detecting irregular migration, identifying forged documents, and apprehending smugglers. Specialised training on human trafficking awareness, victim identification, and appropriate response protocols is also essential. It is worth mentioning that certain UN agencies, such as UNODC, IOM and others are assisting the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and police to enhance their technical capacity to intercept human smuggling and trafficking.
4- Establishing strong information-sharing mechanisms among national and international law enforcement agencies can aid in identifying and dismantling smuggling networks. Strengthening cooperation with source, transit, and destination countries through agreements, joint operations, and sharing of intelligence can effectively combat irregular migration.
5- Addressing the smuggling of migrants in Pakistan necessitates a multifaceted approach that includes cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination. Efforts should focus on addressing the root causes of irregular migration, improving economic opportunities, strengthening border control measures, enhancing law enforcement capacity, raising awareness on risks of irregular migration, and providing support services to migrants, including access to legal aid and safe repatriation when necessary.
6- Launching mass awareness campaigns to educate communities about risks and consequences of irregular migration are vital. These campaigns should focus on highlighting dangers, such as human trafficking, exploitation, and potential loss of life during dangerous journeys. Promoting legal migration pathways and showcasing success stories of individuals who migrated through legal channels can help deter potential migrants from engaging in irregular migration.
7- Partnering with civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that specialise in migration and trafficking issues may help in raising awareness, providing support services to migrants, and facilitating safe and voluntary return when necessary. Collaboration with these stakeholders can ensure a holistic approach to addressing irregular migration.
8- Finally, addressing the underlying push factors that drive irregular migration, such as poverty, lack of employment opportunities, and political instability, requires long-term strategies. Investing in economic and social development programmes, creating job opportunities, improving education and healthcare systems, and promoting social inclusion can reduce incentives for individuals to resort to irregular migration.
While it is disheartening to witness the loss of lives and anguish felt by families who mourn the death of their loved ones, we must channel our grief into meaningful action. Governments, non-governmental organisations, and civil society must unite to prevent similar tragedies in future by implementing and enforcing stricter border management policies, dismantling smuggling networks, and raising awareness about the perils of irregular migration.
The Adriana tragedy is a stark reminder that life should not be endangered in pursuance of a better future. It is incumbent upon nations to prioritise the safety and wellbeing of individuals while addressing the complex socio-economic factors that drive irregular migration.